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MEETING ITS IMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS: 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND EMPLOYEE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
Megan Felter* 
[N]obody’s above the law—except in the U.N. . . . 
—Cynthia Brzak1 
Abstract: The United Nations and its officials have long received immu-
nity in matters related to the organization’s functions, leaving employees 
with only one forum in which to seek redress: the U.N.’s own internal jus-
tice system. Unfortunately, this forum has not properly addressed em-
ployee allegations of sexual harassment. Although recognition of the in-
ternal justice system’s failings led the U.N. to institute significant reforms 
in 2009, this Comment argues that further reforms are needed to ensure 
employee claims are properly handled in the future. 
Introduction 
 Cynthia Brzak, a U.S. citizen and long-time employee of the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva, 
Switzerland, uttered the opening quotation in response to sexual har-
assment and retaliation she allegedly suffered at the hands of United 
Nations (U.N.) officials.2 Pursuing her claims within the U.N. internal 
justice system, only for the Secretary-General to ignore findings con-
firming a U.N. official’s impropriety, Brzak attempted to sue the U.N. 
in the United States.3 Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                      
* Megan Felter is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 Nick Wadhams, U.N. Employee to File Retaliation Claims Against Former Refugee Chief, Kofi 
Annan, Associated Press, Oct. 19, 2005, available at 10/19/05 APALERTMEDIC 20:17:44 
(Westlaw). 
2 Complaint at 2, Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak I ), 551 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (No. 06 Civ. 3432), aff’d 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010). See Wadhams, supra note 1 (re-
ferring to Brzak’s experiences of sexual harassment and retaliation). Brzak, first hired by 
UNHCR in 1980 as a “Clerk/Typist,” became a Training Assistant for UNHCR staff in 
1989. See Complaint, supra, at 3. 
3 See Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak II ), 597 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 151 (2010). 
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dismissed Brzak’s claims, her case nonetheless provides a rare look at 
the U.N.’s internal mechanisms and culture.4 It provides a glimpse of 
the long-standing inadequacies of the U.N.’s internal justice system in 
handling employee allegations of sexual harassment and highlights the 
need for reform.5 Recent changes have significantly improved the U.N. 
internal justice system; however, further reforms are necessary to en-
sure employee claims are properly handled.6 
 Part I of this Comment describes the journey of Brzak’s case, 
which reached the Second Circuit in the United States only after Brzak 
unsuccessfully attempted to navigate the U.N.’s own internal justice 
system. Part II addresses the basis for U.N. immunity before focusing 
on the internal workings of the U.N, including its internal justice sys-
tem and its treatment of sexual harassment claims. Part III considers 
the institutional reforms needed to provide U.N. employees like Brzak 
with an adequate judicial process, taking into account the recent trans-
formation of the U.N. internal justice system. Lastly, this Comment dis-
cusses the need to implement additional reforms in order to provide 
U.N. employees with a satisfactory internal justice system. 
I. Background 
 On March 2, 2010, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the dismissal of a complaint filed by Cynthia Brzak and Nasr Ishak 
against the U.N. and various U.N. officials alleging, among other 
claims, sex discrimination and retaliation.7 In affirming the district 
court’s holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Second Circuit echoed the district court’s reasoning that the U.N. and 
its officials were granted immunity according to the Convention on Pri-
vileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Convention).8 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id.; Steve Stecklow, Sexual-Harassment Cases Plague U.N., Wall St. J., May 21, 2009, 
at A1. 
5 Stecklow, supra note 4 (describing the “[b]ewildering [s]ystem . . . which dates back to 
1946” and “is arbitrary, unfair, and mired in bureaucracy”); see Office of Administration of 
Justice, UN Internal Justice System: About the UN Internal Justice System, http://www.un. 
org/en/oaj/unjs/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2010) [hereinafter About the System]. 
6 See Office of Administration of Justice, UN Internal Justice System: The Old and the 
New System, http://www.un.org/en/oaj/unjs/oldnew.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2010) [he-
reinafter Old and New System]; infra notes 75–82 and accompanying text. 
7 Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak II ), 597 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 151 (2010). Nasr Ishak is a French and Egyptian national who worked in Geneva for 
the UNHCR. In addition to alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title 
VII, the plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, and various state common law torts. Id. 
8 Id. at 110–13. 
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 Brzak’s claims against the U.N. and its officials were not initially 
pursued in the federal courts of the United States; they reached the 
Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit only after Brzak 
engaged in internal U.N. proceedings.9 
 On April 27, 2004, Brzak filed a complaint with the U.N. Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) after she sought advice from co-
plaintiff Ishak regarding an alleged incident of sexual harassment.10 
According to Brzak, the alleged incident occurred following a Decem-
ber 18, 2003 afternoon meeting in the office of Ruud Lubbers, former 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.11 Lubbers allegedly “placed his 
hands on Brzak’s waist, pulled her towards him, pushed his groin into 
her buttocks and held her briefly in that position before releasing her,” 
while others were present.12 
 After Brzak filed a complaint with OIOS, she and Ishak allegedly 
experienced retaliation.13 Brzak was subjected to hostility and verbal 
harassment, and was given inadequate work assignments once her iden-
tity as a whistleblower became known.14 Because of this retaliation, 
Brzak lodged two additional complaints with OIOS.15 
 On June 4, 2004, following its investigation, OIOS issued a report 
to then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan confirming Brzak’s allega-
tions and recommending disciplinary action.16 Annan, claiming the 
OIOS report findings could not be verified and “would not hold up in 
a formal procedure to dismiss Lubbers,” did not pursue disciplinary 
action.17 Brzak subsequently filed a formal appeal with the U.N. inter-
nal justice system, only to experience increased retaliation.18 Because 
                                                                                                                      
9 See id. at 110. 
10 Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak I ), 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 
597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
11 Complaint, supra note 2, at 3. Lubbers was previously the prime minister of the 
Netherlands. Stecklow, supra note 4. 
12 Complaint, supra note 2, at 3. Lubbers, however, alleges that “he merely ushered her 
out of the room with a hand on her back” and that it “was a friendly gesture.” Toby Sterling, 
Former Top UN Refugee Official Calls Sexual Harassment Accuser ‘Pitiful,’ Associated Press, Oct. 
25, 2005, available at 10/25/05 APWORLD 11:58:59 (Westlaw). Lubbers has said that he is 
“troubled by some people involved in this, but not by [Brzak]—she’s pitiful, I can’t do any-
thing with her.” Id. 
13 Complaint, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that Ishak was denied a promotion recom-
mendation). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.; Sterling, supra note 12; Wadhams, supra note 1 (noting that OIOS investigators, 
on the other hand, “insisted that the report was properly done and accurate”). 
18 Complaint, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
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Brzak’s claims garnered significant attention that affected Lubbers’ 
ability to work, he ultimately resigned.19 
 In October 2004, Brzak withdrew her complaint from the U.N.’s 
internal justice system.20 She then filed a Title VII claim against the 
U.N. and its officials, including Annan and Lubbers, with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on October 28, 2005.21 
The EEOC dismissed the case on January 31, 2006 because it lacked 
jurisdiction over the claim.22 On May 4, 2006, Brzak and Ishak brought 
suit in the Southern District of New York.23 The district court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims, holding that it lacked the subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear claims against the U.N. and its officials due to immunity 
granted by the Convention.24 Plaintiffs’ appeal of the district court de-
cision to the Second Circuit was unsuccessful, as that court affirmed the 
dismissal of the case.25 
II. Discussion 
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Brzak’s case is 
consistent with U.S. and international recognition of U.N. immunity in 
matters related to the organization’s functions.26 The U.N. and its sen-
ior officials derive immunity not only from international instruments 
such as the Convention and the U.N. Charter, but also from U.S. legis-
lation as found in the International Organizations Immunities Act 
(IOIA).27 Whereas the Convention grants the U.N. organization abso-
lute immunity, former U.N. officials are granted immunity only if the 
actions at issue were undertaken in the individuals’ official capacity.28 
                                                                                                                      
19 Sterling, supra note 12. 
20 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of the Defendant United 
Nations to Dismiss at 11, Brzak I, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313 (No. 06 Civ. 3432). The U.N. noted 
that Brzak could have sought U.N. Administrative Tribunal review of a Joint Appeals Board 
( JAB) decision if she had not withdrawn her JAB complaint. Reply Memorandum of Law 
in Support of the Motion of the United Nations to Dismiss and to Intervene at 9, Brzak I, 
551 F. Supp. 2d 313 (No. 06 Civ. 3432). 
21 Brzak I, 551 F. Supp.2d at 315. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 318–19. 
25 Brzak II, 597 F.3d at 110. 
26 See Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak I ), 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 
597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
27 See Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak II ), 597 F.3d 107, 111–14 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, 131 S. Ct. 151 (2010); Brzak I, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 317. 
28 See Brzak II, 597 F.3d at 112–13. The Convention grants U.N. officials the same form 
of functional immunity that former diplomats enjoy under international law. Id. at 113. 
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Because U.S. courts have held that employment-related decisions and 
actions fall within the individuals’ official functions and are thus im-
mune, former U.N. officials are in practice granted absolute immunity 
from challenges by U.N. employees.29 Courts cannot consider whether 
the conduct underlying an official act was wrongful; thus immunity has 
been granted even in cases involving “gross negligence, mismanage-
ment, corruption, embezzlement and other types of abuses.”30 A U.N. 
official’s alleged harassment and assault of a U.N. employee similarly 
falls within an official’s functional immunity.31 
 Unable to sue the U.N. in the courts of its member states, U.N. 
employees can utilize, as Brzak did initially, the U.N.’s own internal jus-
tice system.32 Established in 1946, the system has been characterized by 
employees, attorneys, and academics as “slow, underresourced, ineffi-
cient” and “fail[ing] to meet many basic standards of due process.”33 
U.N. employees, considering the internal justice system to be “arbitrary, 
unfair, and mired in bureaucracy,” have expressed little confidence in 
the system’s ability to handle employee complaints.34 
 Criticisms have been leveled at the system for a variety of issues, 
including the underdeveloped role of its informal process and, within 
its formal system, the inadequate appeals process, the unavailability of 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Brzak I, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 319–20; August Reinisch & Ulf Andreas Weber, In the 
Shadow of Waite and Kennedy: The Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations, the 
Individual’s Right of Access to the Courts and Administrative Tribunals as Alternative Means of 
Dispute Settlement, 1 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 59, 63 (2004). 
30 François Loriot, Accountability at the United Nations—in Need of a Genuine External En-
forcement Body, in Accountability, Investigation and Due Process in International 
Organizations 63, 67 (Chris de Cooker ed., 2005) [hereinafter Accountability]; see 
Brzak II, 597 F.3d at 113. 
31 See Brzak II, 597 F.3d at 113. Because Brzak’s sexual harassment and retaliation alle-
gations involved acts undertaken by the defendants in exercise of their official functions 
(abuse of authority in their management of the office in which the plaintiffs worked), the 
courts determined that the defendants were immune. Id.; Brzak I, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 319–
20. The Second Circuit did not, however, address whether the defendants were immune 
from the state law tort of battery alleged by Brzak. Brzak II, 597 F.3d at 113–14. 
32 See Stecklow, supra note 4. 
33 Id.; August Reinisch & Christina Knahr, From the United Nations Administrative Tribunal to 
United Nations Appeals Tribunal—Reform of the Administration of Justice Within the United Nations, 
12 Max Planck Y.B. United Nations L., 447, 448, 450 (2008) (quoting Gen. Assembly, Re-
port of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administration of Justice, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/205 ( July 28, 2006)); see also Loriot, supra note 30, at 67 (stating that “little has 
been done to establish a genuine system of internal justice at the United Nations dealing with 
accountability issues”). 
34 Chris de Cooker, Ethics and Accountability in the International Civil Service, in Account-
ability, supra note 30, at 50; Stecklow, supra note 4. 
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counsel, and the lack of oral hearings.35 The system is vulnerable to the 
Secretary-General’s influence, lacks transparency in its dealings, pro-
vides little protection for whistleblower employees, and proceeds at an 
unacceptably slow pace.36 
 Transparency is a particular problem in employee claims of sexual 
harassment, because although there are a number of such claims, the 
reports and findings created as a result of the internal justice process 
are not readily available.37 Even if investigative reports were more acces-
sible, the recommendations they offer are not independent findings 
binding on the Secretary-General, who can determine whether to pur-
sue disciplinary action against an accused official.38 Added to these is-
sues of transparency and independence is the slow pace with which 
complaints and appeals work their way through the internal justice sys-
tem.39 The time it takes for a claim to be adjudicated is significant in 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Reinisch & Knahr, supra note 33, at 451–53. Employees’ claims were reviewed by 
volunteer panels of their peers, the JAB and the Joint Disciplinary Committee ( JDC), 
which have been described as “deficient, unreliable, and inconsistent.” Loriot, supra note 
30, at 92; Old and New System, supra note 6. To challenge a decision, an employee could 
seek the review of the Office of Human Resource Management; if the employee wished to 
appeal a decision rendered by the Secretary-General, it could seek recourse from the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal. Old and New System, supra note 6. Beginning in 2003, employees 
were allowed to hire outside counsel at their own expense for representation in JAB and 
JDC proceedings; otherwise, voluntary assistance was provided by the Panel of Counsel. 
Loriot, supra note 30, at 92; Old and New System, supra note 6. 
36 See Loriot, supra note 30, at 74–75; Ilias Bantekas, United Nations Employment Law and 
the Causes for Its Failed Senior Female Appointments Record, 6 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 225, 242–43 
(2009); Dina Francesca Haynes, Ethics of International Service: A Reflection on How the Care of 
United Nations’ Staff Impacts the Ability to Fulfill Their Role in “Harmonizing” the World, 30 Ham-
line J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 175, 209–11 (2008); Reinisch & Knahr, supra note 33, at 480–81; 
Ciceil L. Gross, The Status of Women in the UN Organization, 89 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 
190, 195 (1995); Stecklow, supra note 4; Old and New System, supra note 6. 
37 See Loriot, supra note 30, at 74; Haynes, supra note 36, at 209–11; Stecklow, supra 
note 4. 
38 See Loriot, supra note 30, at 75, 82 (describing the Secretary-General’s ability to ignore 
OIOS recommendations and calling for U.N. justice to be provided by an independent out-
side entity); Bantekas, supra note 36, at 242–43 (stating that “no separation of powers has 
been found to exist and the Secretary-General has until now been acting as legislator, judge 
and enforcer of employment relations”); Old and New System, supra note 6. 
39 See Loriot, supra note 30, at 93 (explaining that complainants commonly wait up to 
one year for respondent’s responses and for the Secretary-General’s decisions); Stecklow, 
supra note 4; Old and New System, supra note 6. Brzak withdrew her complaint with the 
U.N. system in part because complaints could take up to five years to wind through the 
system. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of the Defendant United 
Nations to Dismiss, supra note 20, at 11 n.6. 
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light of the inadequate protections afforded to whistleblowers, who may 
face retaliation as severe as termination.40 
 Faced with a system that lacks independence, transparency, timely 
proceedings, and whistleblower protections, U.N. employees bringing 
sexual harassment claims—particularly women—must also contend 
with a U.N. subculture that accepts ideas of female inequality and ig-
nores incidents of sexual harassment and discrimination.41 As an inter-
national organization, the U.N. faces the significant challenge of merg-
ing into a cohesive workplace the varied cultures, attitudes, and belief 
systems of its member states.42 Because some of its employees do not 
consider women to be equal counterparts to men, the personal atti-
tudes of employees in a “male-dominated” workplace create a situation 
ripe for sexual harassment and discrimination.43 
 Women are also vulnerable to sexual harassment, particularly at 
the hands of their superiors, because their residency is often contin-
gent on their employment with the U.N.44 With a significant number of 
women holding short-term employment contracts, sexual harassment 
whistleblowers share a real concern that their complaints will result in 
termination.45 Such fears are indicative of the lack of protection and 
broader retaliation experienced by employees alleging sexual harass-
                                                                                                                      
40 See Loriot, supra note 30, at 77 (noting that former Secretary-General Annan empha-
sized the need for more robust whistleblower protections); Wadhams, supra note 1 (describ-
ing employees’ disappointment in their supervisors and unhappiness about the absence of 
strong protections for whistleblowers); infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
41 See Gross, supra note 36, at 192; Tamar Lewin, U.N. Furor: Harassment Is Investigated, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/20/nyregion/ 
un-furor-harassment-is-investigated.html (describing the U.N. as “a workplace at which the 
advancement of women has been slow, sexual favors have sometimes been prerequisites for 
promotions or keeping jobs, and where many women believe that if they resist sexual ad-
vances from their superiors, they will lose their jobs”). However, it should be noted that the 
U.N. periodically addressed this issue by circulating bulletins containing policies on sexual 
harassment and discrimination. See U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Preven-
tion of Workplace Harassment, Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Authority, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2005/20 (Nov. 28, 2005); U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Prohibi-
tion of Discrimination, Harassment, Including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority, 
U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2008/5 (Feb. 11, 2008); de Cooker, supra note 34, at 23–24, 38; Lewin, 
supra. 
42 See Haynes, supra note 36, at 178; Office of Administration of Justice, UN Internal 
Justice System: Why Do We Need an Internal Justice System, http://www.un.org/ en/oaj/ 
unjs/why.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Need for Internal Justice]. 
43 Bantekas, supra note 36, at 232, 240; see Haynes, supra note 36, at 209; Lewin, supra 
note 41. 
44 See Gross, supra note 36, at 193–94; Lewin, supra note 41. 
45 See Gross, supra note 36, at 193–94; Stecklow, supra note 4. 
48 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
ment.46 As a Former Secretary of the U.N. Joint Appeals Board ( JAB) 
and Joint Disciplinary Committee ( JDC) stated, “No staff member is 
foolish enough to make a complaint. They would not be believed, and 
if they were believed they would not be protected.”47 
III. Analysis 
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the U.N. and its 
officials are immune in the United States from employee suits alleging 
sexual harassment in the workplace.48 Consequently, the U.N. internal 
justice system is the only avenue for employee recourse.49 
 Because the U.N. system in which Brzak unsuccessfully sought re-
dress was inadequate, reform—including the system’s recent transfor-
mation—has become essential.50 Assuming the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion to uphold U.N. immunity and dismiss Brzak’s case was correct (in 
order to safeguard U.N. independence and avoid an impossibly diffi-
cult scenario in which the U.N. must attempt compliance with all of its 
member states’ employment policies to prevent suit in national courts), 
there still remains an expectation that the U.N. will provide a satisfac-
tory forum for employees to seek redress.51 This expectation is based 
not only upon U.S. and international understandings of due process 
and an individual’s right to an adequate justice system, but upon the 
text of the Convention.52 The U.N. contradicts its duty to provide “ap-
                                                                                                                      
46 See Stecklow, supra note 4 (describing, in cases in which employees claimed sexual 
harassment, instances in which: a supervisor accused of sexual harassment failed to renew 
a female employee’s short-term employment contract; the Secretary-General decided not 
to renew a complainant’s employment contract while she was pursuing an appeal; and a 
U.N. agency accused a complainant of “misrepresentation,” yet censured the accused for 
his inappropriate contact with female employees and his sexual remarks). In the highly 
publicized Catherine Claxton case, a senior male U.N. official found to have sexually har-
assed a female employee received a temporary unpaid position with U.N. Development 
Program after he resigned. Tamar Lewin, Charge by Woman at U.N. is Upheld, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 7, 1994, available at http://www.nytimes.com (search “Charge by Woman at U.N. is 
Upheld”; then follow hyperlink); see also Gross, supra note 36, at 194–95. 
47 Gross, supra note 36, at 190, 194; see also Lewin, supra note 41 (stating that an attor-
ney and former U.N. employee warned potential female complainants that filing griev-
ances could worsen, instead of improve, their circumstances). 
48 See Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak II ), 597 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 151 (2010). 
49 See Stecklow, supra note 4. 
50 See Reinisch & Knahr, supra note 33, at 449. 
51 See Brzak v. United Nations (Brzak I ), 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010); Bantekas, supra note 36, at 228; Reinisch & Weber, supra 
note 29, at 68. 
52 Reinisch & Weber, supra note 29, at 65–66, 68–69; see de Cooker, supra note 34, at 46. 
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propriate modes of settlement” when it fails to provide an adequate 
legal forum.53 Furthermore, the U.N. falls short of its Charter’s goal of 
protecting individual rights when employees alleging sexual harass-
ment are left without appropriate legal recourse.54 
 If the U.N. does not provide employees with an adequate, just, and 
impartial system of redress— “the cornerstone upon which the legiti-
macy of any administrative [t]ribunal must rest” —it may lose the re-
spect of not only its employees, but its member states.55 There is an ex-
treme possibility that, in this era of increased accountability, member 
states may revoke U.N. immunity.56 Such an action would have an ad-
verse effect on the U.N., which must be seen by the world as an auto-
nomous entity outside the influence of its member states.57 The inter-
nal justice system Brzak navigated thus requires serious reform.58 
 To its credit, the U.N. recognized the need for a “complete over-
haul” of its internal justice system.59 In 2005, the General Assembly 
sought, and the Secretary-General established, an expert independent 
panel to assess the internal justice system.60 After receiving the panel’s 
findings, the General Assembly decided in 2007 to implement many of 
the recommended changes.61 The panel’s significant reforms went into 
effect on July 1, 2009.62 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Reinisch & Weber, supra note 29, at 68–69 (quoting language of the Convention, 
art. VIII, § 29(a)). The U.N. acknowledges that “[i]t is a fundamental right of staff at all levels 
to have recourse to an internal justice system.” Need for Internal Justice, supra note 42. 
54 See Reinisch & Weber, supra note 29, at 70 (quoting Effect of Awards of Compensa-
tion Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 
47, 57 ( July 13)). 
55 Maria Vicien-Milburn, Promoting the Rule of Law Within the United Nations, 43 Int’l 
Law. 51, 53 (2009) (quoting Fernandez v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 1146, at 9, U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/1146 (2003)); see Reinisch & 
Weber, supra note 29, at 68; Benedict Kingsbury & Richard B. Stewart, Legitimacy and Ac-
countability in Global Regulatory Governance: The Emerging Global Administrative Law and the 
Design and Operation of Administrative Tribunals of International Organizations, http://www. 
iilj.org/aboutus/documents/LegitimacyAccountabilityandGAL.UNATvolumefinalAug82008. 
pdf (accessed through http://www.iilj.org/research/InternationalLawandtheUN.asp) (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
56 See  Reinisch & Weber, supra note 29, at 68; Kingsbury & Stewart, supra note 55, at 1, 
15. 
57 Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights 
and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 53, 87 (1995). 
58 See Reinisch & Knahr, supra note 33, at 448–49. 
59 Id. at 454. 
60 United Nations: UN’s Internal Justice System Marks One-Year Anniversary with Hundreds of 
Cases, M2PressWIRE, July 2, 2010, available at 7/2/10 M2PW 00:00:00 (Westlaw); About 
the System, supra note 5. 
61 About the System, supra note 5. 
62 Id. 
50 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
  The new U.N. system addresses some of the problems Brzak faced 
when bringing her sexual harassment claim in 2004.63 First, the new 
two-tier system, which allows U.N. Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) decisions 
to be appealed to the U.N. Appeals Tribunal (UNAT), is wholly inde-
pendent of the Secretary-General.64 The Secretary-General is bound by 
UNAT judgments and can no longer choose to disregard JAB and JDC 
recommendations.65 Now that cases will be reviewed by qualified 
judges, instead of peer-based JABs and JDCs, sexual harassment com-
plainants can expect more professional and impartial evaluation of 
their claims.66 Overall independence of the entire system has been 
strengthened by the establishment of the Office of Administration of 
Justice, which oversees the new system in its entirety.67 
 Secondly, the U.N. has instituted a more robust informal system 
that includes mediation and, as a first step in the formal system, a man-
agement evaluation to encourage resolution of claims before litigation 
is needed.68 These steps demonstrate the U.N.’s aim to diffuse conflicts 
and remedy faulty decisions from an early stage; efforts that could pro-
tect employees from a prolonged process of pursuing a claim in court.69 
Consistent with this endeavor is the new system’s focus on timeliness, as 
the first step in the formal process must now meet specific deadlines.70 
 Although these reforms have created a system more amenable to 
employee claims, there is still more to be done to create an internal jus-
tice system that parallels the protections afforded in national courts.71 
The United States could supplement U.N. employees’ calls for account-
ability and U.N. leadership’s current reforms by pressuring the organi-
zation to implement further changes.72 Transparency is still a concern, 
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as investigative reports are not readily available to claimants.73 Also, ac-
cess to the system could be broadened to include non-staff members 
and staff associations.74 If staff associations were able to bring suits on 
behalf of U.N. employees, it could temper the possible retaliation ex-
perienced by a lone employee bringing his or her individual claim.75 
 Finally, the U.N. internal justice system adjudicates disputes only 
with regard to the contractual terms and conditions of a staff member’s 
employment.76 As an organization responsible for protecting individual 
rights, it could expand applicable law in employee grievances to in-
clude not only the contractual terms of employment, but broader con-
cepts such as a duty of care owed to the employee and notions of the 
employee’s basic rights.77 Such measures would go a long way in gain-
ing U.N. employees’ trust in the new system.78 
Conclusion 
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Brzak’s claims in 
Brzak v. United Nations shed much-needed light on the U.N. internal jus-
tice system. Implicit in the United States’ generous grant of immunity to 
the U.N. is an expectation that employees will have access to a justice 
system that meets fairness and due process requirements. As Brzak’s 
case demonstrates, the U.N. system is ill-equipped to meet the needs 
and rights of employees alleging sexual harassment in the workplace. 
However, the significant reforms recently implemented by the U.N. have 
created a more autonomous, authoritative, and professional internal 
justice system that can better serve U.N. employees. Although the sys-
tem’s extensive transformation is commendable, further reforms are 
needed to ensure employee claims are properly handled in the future. 
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